Julea Ward (Courtesy of Alliance Defense Fund)
I posted a year-and-a-half ago on two cases where Christian counseling students were expelled from their graduate counseling programs because they believed homosexuality was wrong. At the time one of these cases, Eastern Michigan University’s decision to expel Julea Ward had been affirmed in Federal district court.
Yesterday the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the lower court’s decision. This is a huge victory for protecting the religious liberty of students. As the court held that Eastern Michigan University may have violated the Constitution by expelling Ward based on her religious beliefs about homosexual conduct.
A recap of what happened leading up to her expulsion. Ward was a graduate student in Eastern Michigan University’s counseling program. She had four classes left to take before graduation. She maintained a 3.91 GPA in her program. She was required to complete a counseling practicum, in which she would counsel clients under the supervision of a faculty member. She made it clear that she was willing to counsel homosexual clients on a variety of matters, but that her religious beliefs would forbid her from affirming their same-sex relationships.
In one instance she asked her faculty supervisor permission to refer her client to another counselor. Permission was granted for her to do this. Soon after she was expelled from the University on the ground that the referral violated the university’s code of ethics. She then filed a lawsuit, alleging that the expulsion violated her rights of free speech and free exercise of religion.
The court in writing its opinion wrote:
Ward was willing to work with all clients and to respect the school’s affirmation directives in doing so. That is why she asked to refer gay and lesbian clients (and some heterosexual clients) if the conversation required her to affirm their sexual practices. What more could the rule require? Surely, for example, the ban on discrimination against clients based on their religion (1) does not require a Muslim counselor to tell a Jewish client that his religious beliefs are correct if the conversation takes a turn in that direction and (2) does not require an atheist counselor to tell a person of faith that there is a God if the client is wrestling with faith-based issues. Tolerance is a two-way street. Otherwise, the rule mandates orthodoxy, not anti-discrimination. (Emphasis is mine)
Exactly, as I said in my original post:
Not only have these schools prohibited the free exercise of religion, but by telling these students they can stay if they believe differently is establishing a religious doctrine. I’m sure they don’t see it that way, but we all have religious beliefs. Nobody lives in a moral and religious vacuum.
The court pointed out evidence of religious speech discrimination during the University’s disciplinary inquiry:
Many of the participants’ comments and questions focused on Ward’s beliefs and her religious objection to affirming same-sex relationships. Professor Dugger said that Ward “communicated an attempt to maintain [her] belief system and [her] behaviors,” id. at 8, and dismissed the religious basis of Ward’s objections: She offered her “professional opinion” that Ward was “selectively using her religious beliefs in order to rationalize her discrimination against one group of people” because Ward said that she could “set aside her religious values” and counsel clients about things such as “abortion, child abuse, and murder” but “could not set aside her religious values in order to effectively counsel nonheterosexual clients.” Id. at 5–6. This line of inquiry suggests a distinction between secular values and spiritual ones, with a preference for the former over the latter. Besides, the reason why Ward (in Professor Dugger’s words) could “set aside her religious values” in counseling clients about “abortion, child abuse, and murder” is because the university likely would not insist that she affirm the values underlying this conduct.
Pressing these points, Dugger asked Ward whether she would “see [her] brand of Christianity as superior to” that of a Christian client who viewed her faith differently. Id. at 28. In the same vein, Professor Marx queried “how someone with such strong religious beliefs [as Ward’s] would enter a profession that would cause [her] to go against those beliefs . . . by its stated code of ethics.” Id. at 31. And Professor Francis took Ward “on a little bit of a theological bout,” id. at 28, asking whether she believed that “anyone [is] more righteous than another before God?” and whether, if Ward’s stated beliefs were true, “doesn’t that mean that you’re all on the same boat and shouldn’t [gays and lesbians] be accorded the same respect and honor that God would give them?”
Evidence of the faculty’s hostility to Christianity in this instance is made plain, and the court in their ruling said:
Many of the faculty members’ statements to Ward raise a similar concern about religious discrimination. A reasonable jury could find that the university dismissed Ward from its counseling program because of her faith-based speech, not because of any legitimate pedagogical objective. A university cannot compel a student to alter or violate her belief systems based on a phantom policy as the price for obtaining a degree.
They continue…
On its face, the ACA code of ethics sets forth neutral and generally applicable policies, and the university has ample authority to adopt these policies, including the anti-discrimination provisions, for the school’s graduate counseling program. What poses a problem is not the adoption of an anti-discrimination policy; it is the implementation of the policy, permitting secular exemptions but not religious ones and failing to apply the policy in an even-handed, much less a faith-neutral, manner to Ward.
This case has now been remanded to district court for further proceedings to go before a jury instead of the decision being made by an individual judge.
You can read the whole opinion for yourself below:
Related articles
- Another legal victory for religious liberty: U.S. Sixth Circuit rules in favor of Michigan student expelled for religious views… (becketfund.org)
- -US 6th Circuit: Rules in Favor of Expelled Student and Religious Freedom (answersforthefaith.com)
- Sixth Circuit Revives Free Speech Lawsuit over Grad Student’s Firing (blogs.wsj.com)
- 11th Circuit: Counseling Student Was Rightfully Expelled For Intending To Condemn Gay Clients (thinkprogress.org)
- A Victory for Freedom of Speech in Academia (gratiaetnatura.wordpress.com)
Shane Vander Hart
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The court did NOT say that the lower court judge erred but simply granted Ward a jury trial. She’ll have a hard time convincing people that she is willing to set aside her religious beliefs for some people, in the case of abortion (as she said above) but not for other people (as in the case of gay people). When she loses, the religionists will again cry foul that they aren’t allowed to harm gay people as they think their religion instructs.
Yes they did Jeffrey, I read the ruling. The pointed out several problems with the district court ruling.
You’re just being a partisan shill.. She was more than willing to counsel gay people about a whole host of issues other than relational ones, and then in keeping with ACA practice would make a referral if she didn’t think she could provide the counseling.
How is that harmful to a gay person?
I’d say, based on your comment, that you’re the intolerant one.
Shane the headline really should be changed. This decision overturned the lower court’s ruling of summary judgement in favor of the school. A summary judgment is granted pre-trial when a party asserts that all the allegations when taken as true do not lead to a legal cause of action. A court will generally interpret the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (the student in this case). By reversing the decision, the appellate court did not find the student’s rights were violated but rather that sufficient factual dispute still existed to warrant a trial. At trial a court will weigh the evidence and it could still be determined that the student’s rights were not violated.
They clearly said that dismissal on the grounds of her religious views alone was problematic. I understand it was deferred back to the lower court for a jury trial.
So what was my title? That she “could not be expelled for her religious views.” They clearly said that. If they had a no referral policy that was spelled out early on or spelled that out in the admissions process that would be one thing – unfortunate and discriminatory, but a different matter. She could have (and I would recommend) that she choose a different school that demonstrated more tolerance to different view points are respected religious conscience.
They didn’t, and they had a referral policy already which she utilized and her faculty supervisor agreed to.
I would be shocked if a jury doesn’t reverse the previous decision. Juries tend to be more about justice and less about social engineering than individual judges are. What this school did to her was unfair and inappropriate.
Shane the Court also clearly said, “None of this means that Ward should win as a matter of law with respect to her free speech or free exercise claims.” The Court found that if the evidence is construed in Ward’s favor she would win and if construed in the university’s favor, the university would prevail. Your headline implies that the court found Ward was in fact discriminated against on the basis of her religious beliefs. When the court says Ward cannot be discrimnated against because of her religious views it is either presented in the context of what a reasonable jury could find (but does not necessarily have to find) or in the context of citing rules developed in earlier case law. The ruling in this case is simply that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the University violated Ward’s First Amendment rights. There is no ruling that such a violation actually occured.